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Summary
The purpose of this study is no more 
than to give a brief summary of the his-
tory of business organisations in public 
ownership in Hungary along the logic of 
a recently published large monography. 
Using the method of descriptive histori-
cal approach, facts are established as a 
result of a kind of syncretistic literature 
overview. As a basic idea, with a view to 
the “Sitz im Leben” approach, the evo-
lution of public business organisations 
may be compared to the development of 
public finances, and should be managed 
embedded in the latter, similarly to the 
economy, which always functions embed-
ded in the society.
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Introduction
Public business organisations have a rela-
tively short history in Hungary. Their de-
velopment can be analysed since the 19th 
century. In my opinion, the existence of 
public business organisations as peculiar 
legal entities should be compared to the 
development of Hungarian public fi-
nances as they are closely and inalienably 
related to state finances and the general 
government. Due to this interrelation-
ship, on the review horizon I describe the 
overall public finance environment of 
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the given era, as a background to public 
business organisations and the hotbed of 
their existence and operation.
The evolution of public business or-
ganisations may not look back to times 
before the appearance of business organ-
isations and their regulation by Hungar-
ian company law, as the establishment of 
business organisations presupposes that 
of public business organisations. This 
follows from their conceptual definition, 
as under the currently effective statutory 
regulations, a publicly owned business 
organisation is nothing else than “a busi-
ness organisation in which the Hungar-
ian State, a local government, a local 
government’s partnership having legal 
personality, a multi-purpose micro-re-
gional council, a development council, a 
minority government, a minority govern-
ment’s partnership having legal personal-
ity, a budgetary organisation or a public 
foundation have majority control, either 
separately or jointly.”1 I have performed 
all this along the logic of and reflecting, 
among others, on two monographies by 
Csaba Lentner.2
Between the 19th and the second 
half of the 20th century
As Tekla Papp also correctly establishes, 
the first, perhaps somewhat weak, initia-
tives taken for the codification of Hun-
garian company law started with Act 
XVIII of 1840 (Papp, 2000). Of the cor-
porations relevant for our topic, the joint 
stock company was first defined in this 
act (in addition to general partnerships 
and limited partnerships), and has re-
mained one of, and also the most charac-
teristic, legal forms of public companies 
ever since then. However, this legislation 
merely outlined a rudimentary formation 
of a joint stock company, which was un-
suitable for construing the foundation of 
public businesses. The merit of this work 
is that it can be considered as the very first 
codification in Hungarian company law, 
which remained in effect up to the entry 
into force of the monumental Trade Act 
(which entered into force on 1 January 
1876), in other words, up to the period 
after the Compromise. In 1867, nearly 
two decades of opposition and lengthy 
negotiations, the compromise between 
Austria and Hungary was born with Act 
XII of 1867. The Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy, a state with two centres, which 
was established at that time, meant the 
alliance of two legally equivalent states. 
Common affairs included foreign affairs, 
military affairs and especially – perhaps 
most importantly, as, to quote General 
Raimondo Montecuccoli, “War requires 
three things: money, money and money” 
– finances, required to provide coverage 
for the first two. Csaba Lentner points 
out that the Compromise marked the 
beginning of some fifty years of a spec-
tacular economic development (Lentner, 
2019), and this is consistent with a simi-
lar assertion by historian Dániel Szabó 
(Szabó, 2001). That period already saw 
the appearance of significant economic 
thinkers, like Széchenyi, Wesselényi and 
Bezerédj, and specialised policy-makers 
managing finances, like Ferenc Duschek. 
Both Ernő Huszti (2001) and Lentner 
(2019) recognise this statesman’s concep-
tual achievements in public finances. 
The majority of finance ministers 
after the Compromise appropriately 
managed financial policy as well as the 
executive apparatus, but three person-
alities, Menyhért Lónyai, Kálmán Széll 
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and Sándor Wekerle, stand tall among 
them (Lentner, 2017). Their knowledge, 
professional grounding and managerial 
skills were extremely high-standard, and 
it was no accident that all the three were 
also academicians, as recognised by Gá-
bor Hamza (2015). The first public busi-
ness organisation, the Hungarian state 
railways, which celebrated the 150 years 
anniversary of its incorporation recently, 
was established in this period. After 1846, 
exclusively privately owned railways op-
erated in Hungary, disregarding a short 
period between 1850 and 1855, when the 
management in Vienna was considering 
state-owned railways. By 1855, the Austri-
an state treasury had been completely ex-
hausted by the operation of state-owned 
companies; railways were once again 
given into private ownership. Then the 
wise Hungarian government realised the 
importance of a public holding strategy, 
and in 1868 it took a significant part of 
the railways into state ownership, and 
then in 1869 it established the Hungarian 
Royal Railways in the form of a joint stock 
company. This state-owned joint stock 
company continued its unbroken devel-
opment up to World War I, and by the 
way, the company made profits. The oth-
er successful state-owned company was 
the strategically important Hungarian 
River and Maritime Navigation Limited 
(Suba, 2018). As a preliminary, mention 
should be made of the fact that the Dan-
ube Steamboating Company, established 
in 1829, had monopoly up to 1858. At the 
recommendation of István Széchenyi, this 
shipping company built the largest ship-
yard in Óbuda. For a long time, this was 
Hungary’s largest industrial plant, which 
introduced a new work style, working 
methods and occupations with English 
contribution along the River Danube. Af-
ter the 1867 Compromise, Hungarian na-
tional economic concepts and interests 
could be increasingly enforced within the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. One such 
important transport-related business in-
terest was breaking the predominance of 
D.G.T. in shipping by the establishment 
of an independent, state-owned shipping 
company that served Hungarian inter-
ests. In terms of public finances, this joint 
stock company could only be established 
from the reserve of the Hungarian Dis-
count and Exchange Bank. However, this 
financial institution was Hungarian only 
in its name, as there was no independent 
Hungarian central bank at that time, and 
it met Hungarian companies’ demand for 
external resources and acted as a lender 
to the government in a period when the 
one-tier banking system under the con-
trol of foreign capital (Kövér, 1992). The 
drawbacks of the liberal money manage-
ment and allocation, characteristic of the 
time, are comparable to the recent past – 
I mean the period of history immediately 
preceding 2010.
The significance of state-owned com-
panies in the national economy was par-
ticularly illuminating during the Great 
War, and then the period reviewed in this 
study falls between the two World Wars. 
state-founded and state-owned Workers’ 
National Patient Support and Casualty 
Insurance Fund, which entered the mar-
ket of insurers and provided insurance 
products citizens could initially use on a 
voluntary basis. On the other hand, the 
state-owned shipping company contin-
ued operation as an exemplary company, 
ensuring a peculiar ethos for its employ-
ees and was surrounded by general social 
recognition (Szávai, 2017). However, it 
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is important to note – and I agree with 
Csaba Lentner’s assumption – that the 
most important, landmark action taken 
in the financial and economic field in 
this period was the establishment of the 
National Bank of Hungary on 26 April 
1924 and the setting up of independent 
monetary administration. Undoubtedly, 
this wise government decision has the 
highest impact on Hungary’s current fi-
nances (Lentner, 2019). A similar conclu-
sion is made by Károly Bognár (1994). In 
the life of the profitable and developing 
state-owned companies, the processes 
triggered by the 1920 Peace Treaty of Tri-
anon – specifically, the damage caused 
to Hungary’s territory, population and 
economy, which reduced Hungary to 
the smallest, economically and militar-
ily weakest and, due to the international 
constraints, the most vulnerable coun-
try in Hungary’s surroundings – caused 
drastic changes, and the government 
responded by their reorganisation, but 
without reducing state contribution, as 
it recognised that the state had an out-
standing role in the national economic 
strategy. As a result of changes in the bor-
derline, the country’s economic struc-
ture was fundamentally re-arranged. The 
remaining economic structure became 
disproportionate, development halted 
and these trends were further increased 
by the mutual isolation policy. The pre-
viously uniform market was replaced by 
new customs borders, customs tariffs and 
economic policies.
The key characteristic feature of the 
early years in the period was that after 
several centuries of “limited independ-
ence”, the country regained and created 
it sovereignty in every respect. In order 
to establish financial stability, a new na-
tional currency, the pengő was issued. 
The primary task of the first few years 
was stabilisation: the framework of the 
country’s operation had to be set up and 
re-shaped, the internal and external po-
litical and economic relations had to be 
re-organised and the national currency 
had to be created. Lentner correctly rec-
ognises that the economic consolidation 
and the stability of public finances may 
be best related to Prime Minister István 
Bethlen; however, he critically notes that 
the statesman should not be placed on a 
pedestal (Lentner, 2019). The country 
successfully stabilised the economy, so-
ciety and the political institutions, and 
despite difficult circumstances, by 1929 
the national income had increased by 10 
per cent, while an impressive economic 
growth had been achieved relative to the 
low point seen after World War I.
The defensive economic policy of the 
era, increase in state holding and own-
ership, and strengthening Hungarian 
working capital increased the number 
and weight of state-owned companies: 
state-owned industrial factories were es-
tablished one after the other, and the ho-
tel business, recreational and spa facili-
ties flourished. However, the 1929–1933 
global economic crisis broke the impetus 
of development and contained compa-
nies’ opportunity to operate. Financial 
problems were encountered in Hungary 
in 1931, but already in the previous years, 
several countries in the region had accu-
mulated short- and long-term debt, and 
primarily American and British lenders, 
who did not feel safe, started to with-
draw their loans, causing serious pay-
ment problems to the state. In 1931 the 
disclosed collapse of the huge Viennese 
bank Creditanstalt further accelerated 
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the process. The purchase of foreign 
currency by Hungarians increased and 
significantly reduced the central bank’s 
currency and metal stocks – similarly to 
the developments seen during the 2007–
2008 crisis. Hungarian financial institu-
tions, with ownership and shareholder 
structures already showing signs of in-
creasing state role, satisfied all demand 
that were made, and nevertheless, the 
risk of panicky deposit withdrawal was 
threatening, and did actually take place 
in Bucharest, Sophia, Athens and Germa-
ny. Bank closure could not be maintained 
for a long time, since not only payments 
were not transacted but taxes were also 
not collected and wages could not be dis-
bursed either. In 1933, the nominal value 
of the national income dropped to 55 per 
cent of the corresponding 1929 figure, 
and even in 1938 it only exceeded the 
pre-crisis level by 7 per cent. As a result 
of the crisis, austerity measures were tak-
en, e.g. public servants’ salaries were re-
duced significantly, and as this hindered 
state operation – and the functioning of 
state-owned companies, which were ma-
jor employers –, it also impeded the gov-
ernment’s crisis management. The econ-
omy of the new Hungarian state proved 
to be vulnerable. In 1937–1938 the per 
capita national income was about USD 
120 or 130 of the time, amounting to ap-
proximately 60 per cent of the average 
of Europe. Starting from 1924, foreign 
capital came in the form of short- and 
long-term loans, and was then followed 
by a major influx of working capital into 
the industry. Primarily American, British, 
German and, to a lesser extent, French 
capital bought interest in the Hungarian 
economy. In 1929, the ratio of foreign 
capital was 28 per cent, which gradually 
decreased to merely 24 per cent in 1938. 
After the outbreak of the war, due to Ger-
man economic penetration, the share of 
foreign capital increased again. Draw-
ing conclusions from the experiences of 
the crisis of the time, Lentner cautions 
against attracting extensive foreign direct 
investment, borrowing from abroad and 
exposing the Hungarian national econo-
my (Lentner, 2002; 2016; 2019).
Second half of the 20th century 
After World War II, Hungary was exclud-
ed from western financial modernisation 
for a long time. Our region was placed 
under the influence of the Soviet Union, 
which liquidated the market economy 
built on private ownership and forced 
its own social and economic system of a 
“collective dimension” on the countries 
of the region. For example, in 1946 the 
above-mentioned state-owned shipping 
company was liquidated and a Hungar-
ian-Soviet shipping company (Magyar–
Szovjet Hajózási Rt.) was established, 
which was subsequently replaced in 1955 
by the Hungarian shipping company 
(Magyar Hajózási Rt.), which has been at-
tending to river and maritime navigation, 
operating and supervising harbours since 
then. The harmonic and balanced co-
existence of public and private business 
organisations was disrupted. In fact, only 
the banks taken into state ownership (Na-
tional Bank of Hungary and the Hungari-
an Commercial Bank of Pest) and foreign 
trade companies (e.g. Export Trade and 
Goods Purchase Ltd. and the Hungarian 
Foreign Trade Ltd.) operated in the form 
of commercial businesses, for the most 
part as joint stock companies and only an 
insignificant number of them were lim-
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ited liability companies (Perbíró, 1950). 
The annihilation of the institutions of 
civil society, private capital, private com-
panies and the private market, or their 
reduction to purely formal entities, was 
accompanied by the confinement of mar-
ket economy (“money economy”) at the 
end of the 1940’s. Economic procedures 
were replaced by the planned economy 
regime. Law-decree No. 20 of 1949 or-
dered the taking of medium-sized indus-
trial companies and enterprises in state 
ownership. This action also required the 
establishment of a new kind of control-
ling organisation due to the large num-
ber and diversity of companies. Decree 
No. 102/1950. (IV.4.) Mt. fulfilled this 
demand by subjecting state-owned com-
panies to control under an association 
(Papp, 2000). Lentner (2019) gives a 
critical description of the poor finance 
policy of the period; however, his critical 
tone does not contain exaggerated catch-
phrases or unreasonably sharp remarks. 
Katalin Botos (2007) also recognised and 
highlighted the fact that social tensions 
were traceable not simply to economic 
difficulties. With this assumption she 
refines Gremuska’s findings. Gremuska 
does not draw a dividing line between the 
Rákosi and the Kádár regimes (Germus-
ka, 2012), in contrast, Lentner (2019) 
demonstrates that there are essential 
differences between the finance policies 
of these two periods, and ascertains that 
from the late 1960’s, Hungary moved to-
wards the implementation of a planned 
economy saturated with market elements 
and giving residents every chance to suc-
ceed. Due to domestic political efforts at 
restauration and the displeasure of the 
soviet political leadership, supported by 
foreign political and military pressure, 
this transformation could not be com-
pleted, however, it provided a good basis 
for start of transition to a market econo-
my at the end of the 1980’s, although op-
portunity for the latter was, for the most 
part, seen in the attraction of external 
market participants to Hungary. I agree 
with Lentner who compares the downfall 
of Hungary’s own method of planned 
economy mostly with the failure of the 
1968 reform efforts (Lentner, 2019). In 
addition to state companies having a ho-
mogeneous and monopolistic role, this 
period was characterised by the fact that 
the Finance Ministry merely administered 
financial transactions, as planning was 
given priority and money was assigned 
a passive role. Pricing was applied in the 
planned economy, but indicating relative 
shortage was not included among the pri-
mary tasks of the price regime. Factories 
did not produce because goods had low 
prices, as prices were essentially set by 
the authorities, who also decided in any 
other matter. For this very reason, in the 
case of state companies, profitability or 
efficiency were excluded and not appli-
cable. Although public business organisa-
tions have the most profound role in the 
People’s Republic of China, and Chinese 
public business organisations are in the 
focus of research and the international 
literature, they significantly differ from 
the public companies that were opera-
tive in the People’s Republic of Hungary 
(Milhaupt, 2020). This goes to show that 
the state companies of those days and the 
current ones should not be blurred, de-
spite the fact that the same expression is 
used when they are referred to, as we can 
squarely state that differences between 
them can be demonstrated in everything 
else.
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In the period of transition to a mar-
ket economy, in other words, between 
the change of regime and the turn of 
the millennium, a compulsive assertion 
of the correctness of the government’s fi-
nancial decisions was a constant practice. 
In this respect, Erzsébet Gidai (1996) was 
of the opinion that the largest obstacle 
to financial stability was external indebt-
edness. The assumptions that Hungary 
would be raised by the influx of direct 
investment and that its government defi-
cit could be offset by new borrowing can 
be considered incorrect. Moreover, they 
urged the privatisation of nearly the total 
amount of assets held by the state, and 
complete termination of all the compa-
nies in state ownership, and they wished 
to accomplish the full annihilation of the 
government’s role. One of the decisions 
that can be considered especially flawed 
– mainly in the case of state-owned com-
panies – was the promotion of the phi-
losophy underlying the Washington Con-
sensus, which says that the state should 
withdraw from economy influencing 
and the government’s role should be re-
duced in order to create a vigorous, ef-
ficient and successful market economy, 
or to put it in another way, the neolib-
eral economic policy that characterised 
the 1990’s (up to 1998) in Hungary. In 
contrast, György Matolcsy (1998) recog-
nised as early as 1998 that there was a 
need for the state to undertake a greater 
role, and so state ownership should be 
increased in the strategic sectors. Us-
ing a perfect and neat argumentation, 
Lentner (2019) demonstrates the mis-
guided political decisions that resulted 
in Hungary’s significant exposure to the 
2007–2008 global economic crisis. These 
did not include the decisions adopted 
to consolidate finances and stabilise the 
economy in the period between 1998 
and 2002. We have to agree with Csaba 
Lentner and Nobel Prize awarded econ-
omist Joseph E. Stiglitz, who think that 
the macro-economic models used by 
neoclassical economics were unsuitable 
for forecasting crises; they were built on 
flawed premises, and unreasonably justi-
fied an even supply of information and 
that stakeholders always made reason-
able decisions. In Stiglitz’s opinion the 
absence of an appropriate theory also 
misleads economic decision-makers and 
triggers crises. Lentner traces back Hun-
gary’s crisis to these misguided decisions, 
and concludes in addition that the deci-
sions made by the various governments 
between 2002 and 2010 blindly followed 
the neoliberal market economy model, 
and consequently, innovation in bank-
ing products was not followed by inno-
vation in the supervisory and regulatory 
regimes, which led to the unfolding of a 
crisis not only in mortgage lending but 
also in the entire neoliberal economic re-
gime, as also believed by Tibor Tatay and 
Krisztina Szegedi (Lentner et al., 2017). 
We should agree with the claim that the 
first step on the road leading out of the 
crisis was increasing the role of the gov-
ernment (Lentner, 2019), consequently 
the strengthening of public business or-
ganisations, especially the repurchase of 
the shares in MÁV (the Hungarian State 
Railways), the acquisition of shares in 
MOL (the Hungarian oil company) or 
the establishment of an increasing num-
ber of waste management companies in 
local government and the state owner-
ship, and increasing the state’s share in 
the energy market (district heating, Paks 
Nuclear Power Plant etc.).
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In addition to increasing state owner-
ship in companies operating in strategic 
sectors, increasing the number of public 
companies and their role in the econo-
my, favourable developments took place 
in fiscal policy, including the placing the 
Hungarian tax regime on a new footing 
after 2010. The principal elements in this 
change included a change in the struc-
ture of taxation, through reducing taxes 
on labour and capital while simultane-
ously increasing taxes on consumption 
(Varga, 2017), which improved the effi-
ciency of public companies’ operation. 
Legitimisation of the tax system and the 
entire economy and the reduction of the 
shadow economy have turned general dis-
trust in public business organisations and 
the opinion that they were the hotbeds 
of corruption and the embezzlement of 
public funds. The efficient and success-
ful controlling and supervisory role of 
State Audit Office had no small part in 
this, as by statutory authorisation, it has 
regularly audited state- and local govern-
ment-owned business organisations since 
2011. Another major contribution was 
the incorporation of elements like the 
ideas represented by leading economists 
György Matolcsy (2016) and Domokos 
László (2015) in thinking about public 
finance. With the restoration of the in-
stitutional approach and with the appre-
ciation of transparency, a public finance 
management approach, unconventional 
economic policy and illiberal economic 
thinking, a new era commenced in the 
operation of public (government and lo-
cal government-owned) business organi-
sations. For this reason, these companies 
have become the engines of economic 
growth, and as the professor puts it: “If 
there is growth, and financial balance 
underlying growth, and if companies and 
employees are interested in expanded 
reproduction, economic policy leads to 
success” (Lentner, 2019, p. 250). The 
most recent milestone in the favourable 
trend seen after the crisis is the amend-
ment of Act CXXII of 2009 on the more 
economical operation of business organi-
sations in public ownership, which affects 
most businesses in local government or 
state ownership. The amended regula-
tion, which entered into force in January 
2020, represents a significant change in 
the requirements related to the manage-
ment of public organisation, primarily in 
respect of requirements relating to inter-
nal control and supervisory boards, to 
the personnel of internal control organi-
sations and to their work performance, 
and to the newly established compliance 
organisations. In addition, Hungary 
seems to be joining the developed Euro-
pean states through the good practice of 
public business organisations (Kecskés, 
2019).
Conclusion
In conclusion of the brief overview of the 
history of 150 years and of the histori-
cal experiences, although the brief his-
tory Hungary’s publicly (state and local 
government) owned business organisa-
tions had its ups and downs, due to the 
favourable changes implemented in the 
most recent past – in the field of public 
finances – gives a forward-looking pic-
ture. Initially (in the first half of the 19th 
century) we could experience that such 
companies were established with a delay 
compared to the West, as the state or gov-
ernment, acting as legislator, only recog-
nised its significance considerably later. 
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Due to the favourable fiscal environment 
after the Compromise, the gap was closed 
and well capitalised Hungarian state 
companies of strategic significance and 
representing national interest were estab-
lished and rapidly developed for more 
than fifty years, although naturally, the 
world historical impacts broke this curve 
after the Peace Treaty of Trianon, and 
then again as a result of the 1929 crisis. 
It can be established that during social-
ism, an economic approach unfamiliar to 
Hungarians and inflicted on the country 
by external force, state farms were by na-
ture extremely different from the public 
companies that operated before or that 
have been operating since that period. 
In the period of privatisation and during 
the spread of the neoliberal market econ-
omy, the significance of public business 
organisations declined considerably, due 
to the flawed fiscal and public finance 
policy characteristic of the period. Proof 
positive of the close and inalienable re-
lationship between public finances and 
public companies is the change that took 
place in this respect.
Notes
1  Article 1 b) of Act CXXII of 2009 on the frugal 
operation of business organisations in public 
ownership.
2  In relation to the books by Lentner, 2019, and 
on the same topic: Lentner, 2020.
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